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(Orcid:0000-0003-4503-7141)Reviewing the collective ﬁndings from investigations into a range of major events in high-hazard industries has led
to the conclusion that there is a need to develop greater resilience to the organisational and cultural causes of these
events. This requires more rigorous methods for identifying disaster precursors and for supporting intervention
design. A study of the organisational and cultural precursors relating to 12 major events across several industries
revealed shared precursors in areas such as leadership, operational attitudes and behaviours, communication, risk
analysis, learning and oversight and scrutiny. This has enabled statements of good practice to be developed,
together with question sets that can be used by regulators and the industry to proﬁle organisational risk
management resilience and thereby drive organisational learning. The research shows that the processes of
incubation and evolution of disaster events can be complex and exercising control therefore requires development
of more sophisticated ‘tools’ than are currently available. It has revealed repeating patterns of failure and the
importance of psychological and behavioural factors which have led to poor decision-making. Causal loop modelling
is being used to capture these patterns to facilitate the design of more informed interventions. Emerging issues and
new approaches being developed are discussed and examples given.1. Introduction
Serious accidents (and near-hits) still occur ‘out of the blue’ in all
high-hazard industries and, in some cases, occur in organisations
with an excellent industrial safety record. Major transport
accidents, civil engineering project disasters, petrochemical
industry events such as the Bunceﬁeld explosion and Gulf of
Mexico accident and nuclear accidents such as that in Fukushima
all illustrate the potential for major loss of life, environmental
damage and impact on the industry in terms of production,
collateral losses, company value and reputation. They can also
have a signiﬁcant impact on the integrity of national
infrastructure.
The capacity to identify frailties in maintaining risk control in
complex sociotechnical systems is fundamental to maximising
resilience. Increasing engineered complexity, technical
specialisation, fragmented contractual arrangements and other
factors conspire to make it increasingly difﬁcult for individuals
and organisations to recognise weaknesses in risk control. Often,
problems arise because the array of salient variables outstrips
human cognitive capacity to comprehend the complexity of
interactions by using current approaches. This has highlighted a
need for effective decision-support tools.
2. Research background
The analysis reported here draws on important early works on
developing the conceptual framework of complex accidents,
aimed at obtaining an understanding of the underlying causes ofaccidents, carried out by such authors as Turner and Pidgeon
(1997), Pidgeon et al. (1991), Reason (1997) and Toft and
Reynolds (1994).
Other accident models have explored the complex sociotechnical
issues involved. Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory, with its
concept of coupling and complexity, presented an argument for
the need for a greater understanding of the inherent
interdependence within the systems being modelled. ‘Systems’
models and tools have been developed to address this (at least
partially) by Rasmussen (1997), Hollnagel and Goteman (2004),
Leveson (2004), Léger et al. (2009) and others.
In this context, Reason’s Swiss cheese model (SCM) has
exercised considerable inﬂuence. In this approach, weaknesses in
all relevant factors potentially leading to an event are modelled as
‘holes’ in defences arising from risk-control procedural
oversights, failures in engineered systems or the wider cultural
issues which facilitate or allow these holes to develop.
The SCM is seen largely by those who advocate systems-based
approaches (e.g. Hollnagel and Goteman (2004), Leveson (2012))
as reductionist, linear and focused on speciﬁc failures rather than
emergent system-level behaviours. This focus can be at the
expense of understanding more complex accident development
processes involved, particularly in situations where an event arises
at the system level without any speciﬁc ‘failures’ at lower levels.
Such failures can occur due to the structure of the system itselfhts reserved.
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that the actual theory underlying the model better reﬂects the
complexity of reality than the common ‘Swiss cheese’ visual
metaphor may suggest.
Reason (1997) also gave a simple and compelling presentation of
the importance of some of the ‘deeper’ issues leading to what he
termed ‘organisational accidents’. This involves the important
concept of incubation (see also Turner and Pidgeon (1997)) or
‘latent pathogens’.
This paper considers what further should be done to provide the
industry and regulators with practical tools, building on some of the
mentioned approaches, to identify and apply remedial measures to
address organisational and cultural event precursors.
3. Previous research at the Safety Systems
Research Centre
Previous work at Bristol University, initiated by British Nuclear
Fuels and funded by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
(now the Ofﬁce for Nuclear Regulation), studied the
organisational and cultural precursors that underlie the more
easily identiﬁable causes of engineering disasters (Taylor et al.,
2015). This drew on the ﬁndings of an earlier industry study
(Taylor and Rycraft, 2004).
Twelve major events were studied. These were
(a) Port of Ramsgate walkway collapse (UK, September 1994)
(b) Heathrow Express new Austrian tunnelling method (NATM)
tunnel collapse during construction (UK, October 1994)
(c) Longford gas plant explosion (Australia, September 1998)
(d) Tokaimura criticality accident (Japan, September 1999)
(e) Hatﬁeld railway accident (UK, October 2000)
(f) Davis–Besse nuclear reactor pressure vessel corrosion event
(USA, February 2002)
(g) Loss of the Columbia shuttle (USA, February 2003)
(h) Paks nuclear plant fuel-cleaning event (Hungary, April 2003)
(i) Texas City oil reﬁnery explosion (USA, March 2005)
(j) Loss of containment incident at the Sellaﬁeld Thermal Oxide
Reprocessing Plant (UK, 2005)
(k) Nimrod air crash (Afghanistan, 2006)
(l) Bunceﬁeld oil storage depot explosion (UK, 2005).
The published investigation reports on these events on which the
studies were based (references to the relevant reports and the
methodology used are given by Taylor et al. (2015)) repeatedly
reached conclusions which showed that failures were attributable
to very similar organisational and cultural weaknesses, suggesting
that if defences could be developed, they would have wide
applicability.
Organisational and cultural ﬁndings contributing to the events
were then assembled and initially grouped under eight generic
‘themes’ or ‘categories’ [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights re(a) leadership issues
(b) operational attitudes and behaviours (local operational ‘culture’)
(c) impact of the business environment (often commercial and
budgetary pressures)
(d) oversight and scrutiny (O&S)
(e) competence and training (at all levels)
(f) risk assessment and risk management application (also at all
levels)
(g) organisational learning
(h) communication issues.
From these ﬁndings, sets of ‘expectations’ were developed as
statements of good practice in the form of high-level strategic
requirements, which, if recognised and implemented, should
enable organisations to build stronger defences against the
reoccurrence of similar failures.
It is important, however, that duty-holders and regulators are able to
assess not only whether the salience of such event precursors has
been recognised in organisational requirements/policies, but also that
they have been ‘absorbed into the bloodstream’ of the organisation.
Thus, the next vital step is to ensure that actions and practices are
demonstrably in place to ensure that they are carried over effectively
into operational practice at all levels from the boardroom to the shop
ﬂoor. To this end, the expectations were developed into sets of draft
‘penetrating’ questions which actively explore whether ‘reality aligns
with expectation’. Such question sets may provide a valuable tool for
scrutinising existing defences and, in particular, assessing whether
these offer an acceptable degree of resilience to the organisational
and cultural precursors to events. The question sets can be used
collectively to provide an overview of current organisational
capability or to explore particular areas of potential concern.
4. Modelling the overall system
The analysis of events also enables a broader picture of the
resilience of the system involved to be developed. One possible
approach is set out in Figure 1. It starts from the judgement that a
primary issue in all of the events studied is a shortfall/failure in
leadership. Effective leadership provides three essential
requirements in minimising the risk of organisational accidents.
The ﬁrst of these is setting the values and expectations for
‘process safety’; the second is ensuring that there is an effective
safety management system for process safety (SMS), supported
by sufﬁcient resources and with clearly deﬁned accountabilities;
and the third relates to setting and being seen to commit to
attitudes and behaviours which provide a basis for the effective
use of the management system. In this paper, the industry context
of all of these events is referred to as process safety – this is
normally used to refer to chemical or petrochemical industries,
but it is used here to refer to any industry process that relies for
safety on effectively managing the interaction between engineered
systems, processes and people in a complex setting.
The way in which leaders make decisions and the culture which
they set within the organisation is often bounded by the commercial125
served.
Forensic Engineering
Volume 170 Issue FE3
Understanding organisational and
cultural precursors to events
Taylor, May, Weyman and Carhart
Downloadand ‘political’ environment in which the organisation operates. In
nearly all of the events studied, a signiﬁcant precursor to the event
appeared to relate to the actual or perceived pressures on the
organisation. Leaders can still be effective, and safe operations126
ed by [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rigachieved, in the light of such pressures, but what the authors have
called the ‘operational environment’ seems to be an important
factor which can dispose an organisation towards decision-making
which does not take sufﬁcient account of safety risks.Operational environment
For example, external/
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Figure 1. Flow chart of activities/processes related to areas of potential vulnerability within an organisationhts reserved.
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This is strongly inﬂuenced by the ‘tone from the top’. It includes
the way that the workforce commits to procedures, a questioning
attitude, willingness to make rigorous and prudent decisions and
the general way in which the management chain prioritises and
reacts to learning opportunities.
Although there is clearly much overlap, these cultural attributes
have been separated from the issues which are listed on the right-
hand part of the ﬁgure. Issues such as assuring competence, a
process for risk management and management of organisational
change are requirements of the SMS (see, for example, IAEA
(2009) and HSE (2013)). However, their effectiveness is
determined both by leadership expectations and by the operational
culture.
Finally, what has been termed O&S provides a mechanism, if
effective, by which shortfalls in the mentioned areas can be put
right. Not only does it enable organisational learning, providing
opportunities for continuous improvement, but it is also a ‘long
stop’ with the ability to spot and remedy deﬁciencies before they
lead to signiﬁcant events.
Communication failure has also been identiﬁed as an important
factor in nearly all of the events studied. Almost every accident
investigation concludes that at some stage communication broke
down. This can occur in a wide variety of ways, including a
failure by leaders to be clear about requirements for a strong
safety culture backed by demonstration of their own commitment,
breakdown in communication between work groups such as
between client and contractor or between engineering and
operations functions and at a working level in ensuring the
adequacy of risk assessments and handover procedures. Effective
communication provides an essential ingredient in the
effectiveness of all of these. It pervades the whole process map.
5. Issues which need to be addressed
There are four key areas which the authors believe need to be
explored in greater depth if sustainable progress is to be made in
developing greater resilience to the ‘causes’ of major events. In
particular, there is a need to develop ‘practical tools’ based on
deeper understanding and modelling that unpack and bring
transparency to areas of organisational vulnerability that are
masked by the increasing complexity of engineered systems. This
needs to take account of the interplay among structural, cognitive,
social and behavioural elements to enable the industry to identify
and develop sufﬁciently sophisticated risk controls. This requires
the use of a systems approach (e.g. Senge (1990), Blockley and
Godfrey (2017)) to take account of the interactive nature of the
issues identiﬁed.
Four key questions have been identiﬁed from the research which
the authors believe need to be addressed further to achieve the
objective of developing greater resilience to the causes of major
events. These are the following. [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights re(a) Can usable, effective, reliable ‘tools’ be developed, akin to
techniques such as fault trees and probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA), which would enable organisational and cultural
vulnerabilities to be identiﬁed in a systematic way based on
learning from the collective ﬁndings of failure-event analyses
such as those described earlier?
(b) In studying the development of organisational failure,
repeating patterns of failure emerge. Can ways be found to
enable the industry and regulatory bodies to identify
incubating contributors to failure such that their development
can be identiﬁed at an early stage and appropriate mitigation
action be taken?
(c) Almost all of the events embodied elements that were related
to psychological factors which led to ﬂawed decision-making
– for example, leadership style, incomplete or ﬂawed mental
models, cognitive bias and group process effects such as
social conformity and groupthink. Can these recognised
phenomena be integrated into failure models?
(d) Having identiﬁed vulnerabilities, can tools be developed to
enable modelling of alternative intervention strategies to
inform and support decision-making by using a systems
approach to take account of the complexity and interactive
effects involved?
5.1 Assessing vulnerability
Hierarchical process modelling (HPM) provides a detailed
understanding of the ‘top’ process (i.e. the highest-level process
that deﬁnes the purpose of a given activity) in terms of the factors
that lead to the success of that process. The hierarchy elaborates
these factors in increasing levels of detail. It can improve
transparency by enabling stakeholders to ‘walk through the
model’ and understand how lower-level processes affect the
performance of higher-level processes. It thus introduces a
systematic approach to the analysis of the issues and the
opportunity to prioritise them much in the same way that PRA
achieves this in a more conventional engineering context. The
output from HPM can be potentially valuable if it is used as a
systematic method for identifying areas of vulnerability and
consequent priorities for improvement.
As an illustration of the approach, in an earlier publication (Taylor
et al., 2015), a prototype hierarchy was developed for
‘organisational learning’. Here, as a further example, aspects of
O&S are considered further.
When failures occur in organisational processes and/or as a result
of a weak organisational culture, this can be put right before a
major failure occurs by oversight systems designed to alert
different layers of the organisation to the deﬁciencies. Thus, audit
and management review through the responsible line management
function is one safeguard; audit and scrutiny by a broader
business function is another and higher-level corporate oversight
is the third. Each of these has a different focus. Thus, line
management audit and review processes are likely to be most
effective at detecting more detailed shortfalls in procedures and127
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Downloadcompliance with them, while the higher-level processes should
give a broader perspective, enabling cultural and organisational
issues to be identiﬁed against a broad base of comparison and
with the potential beneﬁt of greater independence. However,
information and data become more ‘rolled up’ in progressing up
the organisation. This gives rise to the risk of fostering
superﬁciality, unless there is a strong questioning approach and a
constructive ‘tension’ set up between those parts of the
organisation operating at the ‘sharp end’ and those whose
responsibility it is to inform and provide reassurance to company
boards and executive committees. Beyond this, for ‘high-hazard’
industries in many countries, there will be a regulatory body
providing a range of oversight processes from monitoring to in-
depth scrutiny. Failures in oversight were (perhaps unsurprisingly)
a common feature of all of the events studied. The following
speciﬁc issues were among those identiﬁed.
■ There was a failure to have in place a system such as that
outlined earlier. In some cases there was only a conventional
audit process – often solely within the line and consequently
lacking clear independence. In some cases oversight appeared
generally weak – it did not appear to look beyond paper
systems and failed to identify failures to comply and
deﬁciencies in the underlying safety culture.
■ Oversight processes were sometimes ineffective because they
were either poorly resourced or because reports and feedback
were not given sufﬁcient weight and/or were not the subject
of sufﬁcient questioning by the recipients of the reports. This
was sometimes reinforced by a ‘good-news culture’ in which
‘unwelcome’ ﬁndings were not highlighted or acted on.
■ In some cases, information being fed to senior leaders was
aggregated such that weaknesses relating to particular plants
or functions could not easily be identiﬁed and addressed. On
occasions, there was also a failure to prioritise actions and
then to check that actions had been carried out and had
achieved the desired outcome.
■ Early warning of emerging issues can most effectively be
identiﬁed in the oversight process if key measures and issues
are integrated. Thus, it is not sufﬁcient just to rely on
performance indicators. An effective system uses these
together with audit ﬁndings, event reports and senior leaders
questioning safety performance systematically to the same
depth and intensity to which ﬁnancial and project-related
programmes would normally be scrutinised.
■ Safety departments, which might be expected to provide
independent authoritative advice, were not sufﬁciently
resourced or competent and/or did not have sufﬁcient
authority to stop potentially unsafe operations.
■ In several of the events studied, organisations had once been
strong performers with a good reputation, but this had
gradually eroded without the organisation being aware of this.
This ‘organisational drift’ is thus often an important precursor
to organisational accidents.
■ Failure to detect weaknesses in process safety performance not
only arose from the factors described above, but also from the128
ed by [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all riglack of suitable safety metrics. In some cases overreliance was
placed on metrics relating to industrial safety (e.g. ‘slips, trips
and falls’). In nearly all cases, suitable metrics relating to process
safety were not available or contained only lagging indicators.
■ There was evidence in many cases that leaders were unaware
of the risks associated with the reality of the safety
shortcomings at plant level. Findings were not always
questioned – in some cases probably because of the lack of
expertise at this level about the process safety issues involved
and in others because it appeared that the needs of the broader
business agenda did not align or sit comfortably with the
information being made available through the oversight
processes.
Some features of O&S are shown in an illustrative HPM in
Figure 2. This starts with the ‘key issue’ of the effectiveness of
organisational O&S in terms of the required layered, hierarchical
process. It then moves to the effectiveness of the scrutiny
exercised by the operational function directly responsible (which
in some organisations may also involve a business function with
its own requirements), a corporate safety department independent
of the ‘line’ and reporting at executive team/board level and the
regulatory body. In this illustrative example, the next ‘layer’
tracks from the corporate process to ﬁve lower-level processes.
The ﬁrst of these relates to the focus and attention given by the
top leadership team; the second to their awareness and
understanding of the risks that are being addressed; the third to
the role and effectiveness of the corporate safety function; the
fourth to the various sources of information and data made
available to the top leadership team in order to enable their
decision-making; and the ﬁnal box to the input and value that is
made as a result of a strong relationship with the regulatory body.
In a full HPM, each of the ﬁve subprocesses would be followed
through to the relevant detailed penetrating questions as described
earlier. Draft versions of these were identiﬁed from the authors’
research into the 12 events studied and examples are given by
Taylor et al. (2015).
5.2 Patterns of organisational failure
As noted previously, earlier research at the University of Bristol
Safety Systems Research Centre also identiﬁed repeating dynamic
patterns of system failure in many of the events studied.
Understanding the detailed phenomena underlying these patterns
may provide an effective means of increasing resilience to these
repeating failure modes. In this respect, techniques such as system
dynamics (SD) have already proved very promising in the
authors’ initial studies.
For example, starting with a prototype expert workshop and a
further analysis of the events in which repeated patterns of
failures in contractor management were exhibited (seven of the 12
events), key strategic issues have been recognised and ‘mapped’
and the complexities and interactive nature of these have been
identiﬁed and considered (Taylor et al., 2016). An example ishts reserved.
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highlighting interdependencies and the impact of time lags within
systems as vulnerabilities incubate.
Another example of such a repeated pattern of failure which was
identiﬁed in almost all of the events studied involved a disconnect
between knowledge and aspirations of those at senior management
levels and those planning and carrying out operations. Usually,
there are at least four links in the chain between the most senior
organisational levels, where decisions will be made about major
changes and the appetite for risk, through business group senior
management, plant or project management and engineers and
supervisors at the plant level, to those carrying out day-to-day
operations. In the events studied, there was frequently a failure to
ensure that effective information ﬂows up and down the chain,
and sometimes unintended ‘messages’ arose from a failure to
consider ambiguity and possible incorrect interpretation. For
example, tensions have arisen because of the need to maintain
safety standards and at the same time to pursue productivity and [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights recost objectives. Where this becomes part of custom and practice,
it can be manifested as organisational ‘drift’ and normalisation of
non-standard practice. The absence of ‘bad news’ can also give
rise to unjustiﬁable complacency, characterised by a good-news
culture. Within such a culture, the reality of plant safety is neither
always appreciated nor addressed at more senior levels. The
underlying drivers for this have been shown in the authors’ initial
research to be interdependent, dynamic and complex. To
understand these drivers requires not only an appreciation of the
interaction between relevant dormant precursors, but also an
understanding of the psychological ‘inﬂuences’ which lead to the
attitudes and behaviours that become embedded in the system if
not adequately challenged.
Other patterns of failure that have been identiﬁed as potential
priorities relate to
■ failure to follow procedural requirements when these do not
align with perceptions of individual and organisational needsEffectiveness of
O&S process
Existence of a
‘layered’ hierarchical
process
Operational (line) O&S Corporate O&S Regulatory O&S
Leadership focus
and attention
Leadership
awareness and
understanding of
risks
Independent H&S
department
Sources of input
and processes of
communication
Relationship/input
of regulator
Detailed questions derived from event analysis
Figure 2. Outline HPM addressing effectiveness of O&S. H&S, health and safety129
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Download■ failures in management of organisational change processes
which, while often based on strong procedural requirements,
often do not encourage the open discussion of important
vulnerabilities such as the impact of commercial priorities
■ a continuing inability to learn from experience even where
there is a strong commitment to do so.
5.3 Psychological factors in decision-making
A deﬁning feature of modern large-scale industrial systems and
processes is ever-increasing complexity (Glendon et al., 2016).
Recognising the potential for system failure, and attempting to
engineer ways to mitigate this, pivots on the expertise and
conceptual insight of designers, installers, operators and risk
managers. Despite the development of monitoring systems, fault
trees, risk assessment and other decision-support tools, the issue
of complexity is challenging insofar as the limitations of human
cognitive capacity represent a barrier to recognising potential
pathways to failure. This situation is compounded by the
increasing specialisation and bureaucratisation of expertise, such
that knowledge becomes bounded and compartmentalised
(Rasmussen, 1997).
A widely recognised cognitive strategy for dealing with
complexity, particularly for time-sensitive decisions (e.g. in
emergency situations, during process disruptions), or simply
because it is quicker and easier, is to draw from a library of tried-
and-tested solutions. This might involve extrapolating from
‘recognised’ patterns, or selecting a smaller number of what are
deemed to be key variables, the interactions between which can be
more readily comprehended (Rundmo, 1992). Much of this
processing can be characterised as inferential sense-making based
on pattern recognition, referenced to a mental model of how salient
features are believed to interact (Doyle and Ford, 1998). Most of
the time, such strategies serve well – indeed pattern recognition
and heuristics are an essential features of how human beings
operate. However, they can prove problematic where important
features go unrecognised or are underplayed – for example, where
recourse to old tried-and-tested solutions omits to take account of
unique features of an otherwise familiar presenting issue.
Even where more systematic strategies are adopted, much rests on
the accuracy, completeness and sophistication of the mental
models of the decision maker(s). From the perspective of
organisational resilience, it is important to be able to recognise
where knowledge gaps and misunderstandings proliferate and the
circumstances that might give rise to them. This is particularly
important where personnel have limited conceptual knowledge or
understanding of the systems that they are working with. Resilient
risk management systems take account of and mitigate knowledge
gaps, traits and decision biases (Cox et al., 2003; Woods, 2003).
However, there is need to consider variables beyond the cognitive
traits and capacities. Workplace decisions are made in a speciﬁc
sociopolitical context, where cognitive elements tend to be
moderated and/or mediated by social, structural and technical130
ed by [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rigelements. These include awareness (and intuitions) relating to
corporate/managerial priorities, implications for career prospects,
systems of reward, social approval or disapproval of peers or
superiors and pressing operational demands (Weyman et al.,
2006; Zohar, 2002). It is important to recognise and take account
of how such features of workplace climate play a role in deﬁning
the decision makers’ choice architecture. Other, more subtle
inﬂuences on choice architecture include informal social
inﬂuence; custom and practice; social norms and related variables
that come to deﬁne workplace safety culture. Their relative
salience can also be variable within a single organisation – for
example, between different functions, departments or work teams
(Meams et al., 1998).
The use of safety culture/climate surveys and similar methods
means that many organisations have the capacity to become aware
of weaknesses in this area. However, most struggle with crafting
effective solutions. The capacity to recognise the importance of
safety climate on risk management performance is not matched by
the capacity to ﬁnd effective, durable ways to mitigate undesirable
effects on culture and behaviour (Weyman, 2012).
However, undesirable features attributable to group process effects
are not limited to the shop ﬂoor. While many senior managers
conclude that ‘there is something wrong with their (employee)
safety culture’, many are reluctant to take on board fully their own
role in framing the prevailing safety climate (Gadd and Collins,
2002). Similarly, they are vulnerable to overlooking how group
processes can negatively impact on their own decision-making.
The evidence on group process effects in collective decision-
making highlights both a tendency towards more extreme options
(risky shift and group polarisation) giving rise to excessive risk
seeking or excessive risk aversion and moderation effects. The
amassed ﬁndings point to the conclusion that contextual
components – for example, senior management style, political
expediency of achieving consensus and magnitude of the
consequence of undesired outcomes – can play a key role
(Woods, 2006). Indeed, while group members sharing a common
worldview/mental model can represent a strength, this is
moderated by the risk of sponsoring groupthink. This is
particularly relevant where dissident voices are absent or
suppressed, such that system weaknesses and vulnerabilities are
underarticulated, unrecognised or simply ignored.
The literature on these and related decision-making phenomena is
extensive and is at a fairly mature level. However, to date, there
have been few attempts at its integration with engineering-derived
models of system failure or resilience modelling. There are a
number of fundamental challenges to achieving this, not least with
respect to the characterisation of cause–effect relationships.
What is envisaged is a contribution to failure resilience modelling
that is not unreasonably deterministic (as the underpinning
behavioural science precludes this), but is enhanced throughhts reserved.
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Downloaded bytaking account of behavioural components in the representation of
‘alternative futures’ – that is, possible/foreseeable outcomes
arising from alternative conﬁgurations of features of the
sociotechnical systems under consideration.
Borrowing terminology from the public policy behaviour change
domain, the contribution of the output from the envisaged
resilience veriﬁcation/enhancement models is perhaps usefully
conceptualised as a nudge function (i.e. nudging organisations to
consider the impact of identiﬁed threats to maintaining effective
risk control). Essentially this is envisaged as operating as an
internal challenge function, to support learning in high-reliability
organisations (Argyris and Schön, 1996; Leveson et al., 2009;
Weick et al., 1999).
5.4 Developing effective interventions
The effectiveness of interventions can be improved by developing
a sufﬁcient shared understanding of the problem being addressed.
This helps ensure that any recommendations are grounded in a
robust understanding of the mechanisms generating the problem
situation and that those who are expected to implement them
understand why they are important. This can be challenging when
the problem exhibits signiﬁcant complexity. Problem-structuring
methods, informed by systems theory, offer a means of dealing
with this complexity. One such method is the use of causal loop
diagrams (CLDs). Such diagrams can be developed
collaboratively by those involved as a means to illuminate the
mechanisms underlying the problem to be addressed. These [ University of Bristol] on [23/01/18]. Copyright © ICE Publishing, all rights remodels can then be used as the basis for quantitative SD models,
developing equations that reﬂect the nature of the causal
relationships. These can be simulated and used to develop
conﬁdence in the models, or to perform analysis on the merits and
risks of potential corrective actions.
CLDs are visual models consisting of two components: named
variables and directional arrows representing the causal inﬂuence
that they have on one another. Variables can inﬂuence each other
in one of two ways: ﬁrst, one variable may have a positive
relationship with another in the sense that any change in one
variable causes a similar change in another. In other words, if an
increase in variable A causes an increase in variable B, they have
a positive causal relationship. This is visually represented by an
arrow from variable A to variable B with a ‘+’ sign at the head.
This positive relationship can also mean that a decrease in
variable A would cause a decrease in variable B. The second type
of causal relationship is an inverse or negative relationship (i.e. a
change in variable A causes an inverse change in variable B). This
is represented by an arrow from variable A to variable B with a
‘−’ sign at the head.
When combined, these two types of causal connection can form
feedback loops between the variables. Some feedback loops
reinforce growth or decline of the variables; others work to
balance changes. The diagram in Figure 3 is extracted from a
larger model constructed by experts from a range of process
safety industries in a workshop facilitated by one of the authors ofConsideration of
competency and
communication
requirements
Ad hoc
unapproved
mitigations
Design
concerns
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concerns
Project
delays
Shortcuts
Achievability of
accepted timescale
B1
B3
B5
B4
B6
B2
+
+
+
+ +
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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Downloadthis paper. It shows six feedback loops relating to ‘ad hoc
unapproved mitigations’ to undesirable situations. This has been
identiﬁed, for example, as an important failure mechanism in
some contractual arrangements where the contractor is under
pressure to complete work to time and cost even when there are
emerging problems that need to be addressed. As an extract, it is
presented only to demonstrate the use of CLDs in this context,
rather than to provide comprehensive coverage of the insights or
issues that it contains. One of the strengths of this approach is that
it makes assumptions about the relationships between variables
explicit such that they can then be critiqued and potentially
mitigated by others.
The feedback loop labelled B1 can be read as follows: if project
delays increase, they cause the achievability of accepted timescale
to change in the opposite direction – that is, the achievability of
accepted timescale decreases. A decrease in the achievability of
accepted timescale in turn causes the number of shortcuts taken to
increase and this causes project delays to decrease. Hence, a
balancing loop is formed that attempts to counteract any delays. If
any of the three variables in this loop begin to change, then the
structure of the loop will work against the change.
Similar balancing feedback dynamics play out in the other loops
through ad hoc unapproved mitigations. For example B2 ‘says’
that an increase in safety case concerns could cause project delays
to increase; this in turn reduces the achievability of the accepted
timescale; this reduction in the achievability of the accepted
timescale causes an increase in ad hoc unapproved mitigations in
order to address the safety case concerns, therefore reducing them.
Through collaboratively constructing these diagrams, it is possible
to gain an insight into the nature of the system, design meaningful
interventions to counter unwanted feedback loops and
communicate motivation to those involved in the problem
situation. In some situations, it also allows more effective
performance indicators to be agreed.
6. Conclusions
Major events in high-hazard industries have revealed strikingly
similar organisational and cultural precursors when studied
collectively. These ‘common ﬁndings’ have been brought
together and expectations and question sets have been developed
that should enable duty holders and regulators to explore
potential vulnerabilities more effectively. This is important
because although much progress has been made in addressing
vulnerability arising from engineering and human failure,
systematic approaches to addressing these ‘deeper-lying’
precursors to events have not generally been available.
The authors’ research has not only enabled initial steps to be
taken, but has also pointed to the need to develop new approaches
and associated tools if the often incubating, organisational and
cultural precursors are to be identiﬁed and steps taken to apply
effective interventions. These are as follows.132
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should be developed. Here, HPM provides the basis for an
effective tool which is in some ways analogous with
quantitative risk assessment techniques used in the
identiﬁcation of engineering vulnerabilities.
■ Collective analysis of events shows that patterns of failure
frequently occur. Some of these have been identiﬁed from the
authors’ studies. This demonstrates the need for a systems
approach to address the interactive and connected nature of
many of the identiﬁed precursors.
■ Such a systems approach needs to be underwritten by a better
understanding of the behavioural and psychological inﬂuences
on decision-making. If effective interventions are to be
designed to increase resilience to the causes of major events,
it is important that learning from the social sciences is used to
inform thinking.
■ In addressing the identiﬁed issues, the use of causal loops and
SD shows promise of providing a usable and relatively simple
approach which would allow effective interventions and
associated performance indicators to be developed
collaboratively to take account of the complexity and the
psychological factors involved.
Further research might be proﬁtably aimed at developing new
techniques to address the identiﬁed issues and at developing new
tools and approaches which could be made available to high-
hazard industries and their regulatory bodies to address these and
to provide more effective oversight. The learning from the
collective study of major safety-related events may also apply to
other examples of organisational failure (e.g. ﬁnancial, healthcare).
They may also provide an improved basis for event investigation.REFERENCES
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